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Abstract
The secrecy capacity of relay channels with orthogonal components is studied in the presence of an
additional passive eavesdropper node. The relay and destination receive signals from the source on two
orthogonal channels such that the destination also receives transmissions from the relay on its channel.
The eavesdropper can overhear either one or both of the orthogonal channels. Inner and outer bounds on
the secrecy capacity are developed for both the discrete memoryless and the Gaussian channel models.
For the discrete memoryless case, the secrecy capacity is shown to be achieved by a partial decode-and-
forward (PDF) scheme when the eavesdropper can overhear only one of the two orthogonal channels.
Two new outer bounds are presented for the Gaussian model using recent capacity results for a Gaussian
multi-antenna point-to-point channel with a multi-antenna eavesdropper. The outer bounds are shown
to be tight for two sub-classes of channels. The first sub-class is one in which the source and relay are
clustered and the and the eavesdropper receives signals only on the channel from the source and the
relay to the destination, for which the PDF strategy is optimal. The second is a sub-class in which the
source does not transmit to the relay, for which a noise-forwarding strategy is optimal.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless networks for which nodes can benefit from cooperation and packet-forwarding,
there is also a need to preserve the confidentiality of transmitted information from untrusted
nodes. Information privacy in wireless networks has traditionally been the domain of the higher
layers of the protocol stack via the use of cryptographically secure schemes. In his seminal paper
on the three-node wiretap channel, Wyner showed that perfect secrecy of transmitted data from
the source node can be achieved when the physical channel to the eavesdropper is noisier than the
channel to the intended destination, i.e., when the channel is a degraded broadcast channel [1].
This work was later extended by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner to all broadcast channels with confidential
messages, in which the source node sends common information to both the destination and the
wiretapper and confidential information only to the destination [2].
Recently, the problem of secure communications has also been studied for a variety of multi-
terminal networks; see, for example, [3–10], and the references therein. In [11], the authors show
that a relay node can facilitate the transmission of confidential messages from the source to the
destination in the presence of a wiretapper, often referred to as an eavesdropper in the wireless
setting. The authors develop the rate-equivocation region for this four node relay-eavesdropper
channel and introduce a noise forwarding scheme in which the relay, even if it is unable to
aid the source in its transmissions, transmits codewords independent of the source to confuse
the eavesdropper. A special case where the eavesdropper receives a degraded version of the
destination’s signal is studied in [12]. In contrast, the relay channel with confidential messages
in which the relay node acts as both a helper and eavesdropper is studied in [13]. Note that
in all the three papers, the relay is assumed to be full-duplex, i.e., it can transmit and receive
simultaneously over the entire bandwidth.
In this paper, we study the secrecy capacity of a relay channel with orthogonal components
in the presence of a passive eavesdropper node. The orthogonality comes from the fact that
the relay and destination receive signals from the source on orthogonal channels; furthermore,
the destination also receives transmissions from the relay on its (the destination’s) channel. The
orthogonal model implicitly imposes a half-duplex transmission and reception constraint on the
relay. For this channel, in the absence of an eavesdropper, El Gamal and Zahedi showed that a
partial decode-and-forward (PDF) strategy in which the source transmits two messages on the
3two orthogonal channels and the relay decodes its received signal, achieves the capacity.
We study the secrecy capacity of this channel for both the discrete memoryless and Gaussian
channel models. As a first step towards this, we develop a PDF strategy for the full-duplex relay
eavesdropper channel and extend it to the orthogonal model. Further, since the eavesdropper can
receive signals from either orthogonal channel or both, three cases arise in the development of
the secrecy capacity. We specialize the outer bounds developed in [11] for the orthogonal case
and show that for the discrete memoryless channel, PDF achieves the secrecy capacity for the
two cases where the eavesdropper receives signals in only one of the two orthogonal channels.
For the Gaussian model, we develop two new outer bounds using recent results on the secrecy
capacity of the Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output channels in the presence of a multi-
antenna eavesdropper (MIMOME) in [4–6]. The first outer bound is a genie-aided bound that
allows the source and relay to cooperate perfectly resulting in a Gaussian MIMOME channel
for which jointly Gaussian inputs maximize the capacity. We show that these bounds are tight
for a sub-class of channels in which the multiaccess channel from the source and relay to the
destination is the bottleneck link, and the eavesdropper is limited to receiving signals on the
channel from the source and the relay to the destination. For a complementary sub-class of
channels in which the source-relay link is unusable due to noise resulting in a deaf relay, we
develop a genie-aided bound where the relay and destination act like a two-antenna receiver. We
also show that noise forwarding achieves this bound for this sub-class of channels.
In [14], the authors study the secrecy rate of the channel studied here under the assumption
that the relay is co-located with the eavesdropper and the eavesdropper is completely cognizant
of the transmit and receive signals at the relay. The authors found that using the relay does not
increase the secrecy capacity and hence there is no security advantage to using the relay. In this
paper, we consider the eavesdropper as a separate entity and show that using the relay increases
the secrecy capacity in some cases. In the model of [14], the eavesdropper can overhear only on
the channel to the relay, while we consider three cases in which the eavesdropper can overhear
on either or both the channels.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the channel models. In Section
III, we develop the inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless
model. We illustrate these results with examples in Section IV. In Section V, we present inner
and outer bounds for the Gaussian channel model and illustrate our results with examples. We
4conclude in Section VI.
II. CHANNEL MODELS AND PRELIMINARIES
A. Discrete Memoryless Model
A discrete-memoryless relay eavesdropper channel is denoted by (X1×X2, p(y, y1, y2|x1, x2),Y×
Y1×Y2) such that the inputs to the channel in a given channel use are X1 ∈ X1 and X2 ∈ X2 at
the source and relay, respectively, the outputs of the channel are Y1 ∈ Y1, Y ∈ Y , and Y2 ∈ Y2,
at the relay, destination, and eavesdropper, respectively, and the channel transition probability
is given by pY Y1Y2|XX2(y, y1, y2|x, x2) [11]. The channel is assumed to be memoryless, i.e. the
channel outputs at time i depend only on channel inputs at time i. The source transmits a message
W1 ∈ W1 = {1, 2, · · · ,M} to the destination using the (M,n) code consisting of
1) a stochastic encoder f at the source such that f :W1 → Xn1 ∈ X n1 ,
2) a set of relay encoding functions fr,i : (Y1,1, Y1,2, · · · , Y1,i−1) → x2,i at every time instant
i, and
3) a decoding function at the destination Φ : Yn →W1.
The average error probability of the code is defined as
P ne =
∑
w1∈W1
1
M
Pr{Φ(Y n) 6= w1|w1was sent}. (1)
The equivocation rate at the eavesdropper is defined as Re = 1nH(W1|Y
n
2 ). A perfect secrecy
rate of R1 is achieved if for any ǫ > 0, there exists a sequence of codes (M,n) and an integer
N such that for all n ≥ N , we have
R1 =
1
n
log2M, (2)
P ne ≤ ǫ and (3)
1
n
H(W1|Y2) ≥ R1 − ǫ. (4)
The secrecy capacity is the maximum rate satisfying (2)-(4). The model described above considers
a relay that transmits and receives simultaneously in the same orthogonal channel. Inner and
outer bounds for this model are developed in [11, Theorem 1].
In this paper, we consider a relay eavesdropper channel with orthogonal components in which
the relay receives and transmits on two orthogonal channels. The source transmits on both
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Fig. 1. The relay-eavesdropper channel with orthogonal components.
channels, one of which is received at the relay and the other at the destination. The relay transmits
along with the source on the channel received at the destination. Thus, the source signal X1
consists of two parts XR ∈ XR and XD ∈ XD, transmitted to the relay and the destination,
respectively, such that X1 = XD × XR. The eavesdropper can receive transmissions in one or
both orthogonal channels such that Y2,i ∈ Y2,i denotes the received signal at the eavesdropper
in orthogonal channel i, i = 1, 2, and Y2 = Y2,1 × Y2,2. More formally, the relay eavesdropper
channel with orthogonal components is defined as follows.
Definition 1: A discrete-memoryless relay eavesdropper channel is said to have orthogonal
components if the sender alphabet X1 = XD × XR and the channel can be expressed as
p(y, y1, y2|x1, x2) = p(y1, y2,1|xR, x2) · p(y, y2,2|xD, x2). (5)
Definition 1 assumes that the eavesdropper can receive signals in both channels. In general, the
secrecy capacity bounds for this channel depend on the receiver capabilities of the eavesdropper.
To this end, we explicitly include the following two definitions for the cases in which the
eavesdropper can receive signals in only one of the channels.
Definition 2: The eavesdropper is limited to receiving signals on the channel from the source
to the relay, if
p(y, y1, y2,1, y2,2|xR, xD, x2) = p(y1, y2,1|xR, x2) · p(y|xD, x2) · p(y2,2). (6)
6Definition 3: The eavesdropper is limited to receiving signals on the channel from the source
and the relay to the destination, if
p(y, y1, y2,1, y2,2|xR, xD, x2) = p(y1|xR, x2) · p(y, y2,2|xD, x2) · p(y2,1). (7)
Remark 1: In the absence of an eavesdropper, i.e., for y2,1 = y2,2 = 0, the channels in (5)-(7)
simplify to that of a relay channel with orthogonal components.
Thus, depending on the receiver capabilities at the eavesdropper, there are three cases that
arise in developing the secrecy capacity bounds. For brevity, we henceforth identify the three
cases as cases 1, 2, and 3, where cases 1 and 2 correspond to Definitions 2 and 3, respectively,
and case 3 is the general case where the eavesdropper receives signals from both the channels.
B. Gaussian Model
For a Gaussian relay eavesdropper channel with orthogonal components, the signals Y1 and
Y received at the relay and the destination respectively in each time symbol i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, are
Y1[i] = hs,rXR[i] + Z1[i] (8)
and
Y [i] = hs,dXD[i] + hr,dX2[i] + Z[i] (9)
where hk,m is the channel gain from transmitter k ∈ {s, r} to receiver m ∈ {r, d}, and where
Z1 and Z are zero mean unit variance Gaussian random variables. The transmitted signals XR,
XD, and X2 are subject to average power constraints given by
E[x2R] ≤ PR,
E[ 1
n
∑n
i=1 x
2
D] ≤ PD, and
E[ 1
n
∑n
i=1 x
2
2] ≤ P2,
(10)
where E[.] denotes expectation of its argument. The signals at the eavesdropper are
Y2,1[i] = hs,e,1XR[i]1e,1 + Z2,1[i] (11)
Y2,2[i] = hs,e,2xD[i]1e,2 + hr,eX2[i]1e,2 + Z2,2[i] (12)
where hs,e,1 and hs,e,2 are the channel gains from the source to the eavesdropper in the two
orthogonal channels, hr,e is the channel gain from the relay to the eavesdropper, Z2,1 and Z2,2
7are zero-mean unit variance Gaussian random variables assumed to be independent of the source
and relay signals, and
1e,j =


1 if the eavesdropper can eavesdrop in orthogonal channel j = 1, 2
0 0 otherwise.
Throughout the sequel, we assume that the channel gains are fixed and known at all nodes.
For a relay channel with orthogonal components, the authors of [15] show that a strategy
where the source uses each channel to send an independent message and the relay decodes the
message transmitted in its channel, achieves capacity. Due to the fact that the relay has partial
access to the source transmissions, this strategy is sometimes also referred to as partial decode
and forward (see [16]). The achievable scheme involves block Markov superposition encoding
while the converse is developed using the max-flow, min-cut bounds. The following proposition
summarizes this result.
Proposition 1 ([15]): The capacity of a relay channel with orthogonal component is given by
C = maxmin (I(XR; Y1|X2) + I(XD; Y |X2), I(XRXDX2; Y )) (13)
where the maximum is over all input distributions of the form
p(x2)p(xR|x2)p(xD|x2). (14)
For the Gaussian model, the bounds in (13) are maximized by jointly Gaussian inputs transmitting
at the maximum power and subject to (14).
Remark 2: While the converse allows for all possible joint distributions of XR, XD, and X2,
from the form of the mutual information expressions in (13), it suffices to consider distributions
only of the form given by (14).
We use the standard notation for entropy and mutual information [17] and take all logarithms
to the base 2 so that our rate units are bits. For ease of exposition, we write C (x) to denote
1
2
log (1 + x), and write x+ to denote max(x, 0). We also write random variables with uppercase
letters (e.g. Wk) and their realizations with the corresponding lowercase letters (e.g. wk). We
drop subscripts on probability distributions if the arguments are lowercase versions of the
corresponding random variables. Finally, for brevity, we henceforth refer to the channel studied
8III. DISCRETE MEMORYLESS CHANNEL: OUTER AND INNER BOUNDS
In this section, we develop outer and inner bounds for the secrecy capacity of the discrete-
memoryless orthogonal relay eavesdropper channel. The proof of the outer bounds follows along
the same lines as that in [11, Theorem 1] for the full-duplex relay-eavesdropper channel and is
specialized for the orthogonal model considered here. The following theorem summarizes the
bounds for the three cases in which the eavesdropper can receive in either one or both orthogonal
channels.
Theorem 1: An outer bound on the secrecy capacity of the relay eavesdropper channel with
orthogonal components is given by
Case 1 : Cs ≤ max[min{I(VDVR; Y Y1|V2U), I(VDV2; Y |U)} − I(VR; Y2|U)]+
Case 2 : Cs ≤ max[min{I(VDVR; Y Y1|V2U), I(VDV2; Y |U)} − I(VDV2; Y2|U)]+
Case 3 : Cs ≤ max[min{I(VDVR; Y Y1|V2U), I(VDV2; Y |U)} − I(VRVDV2; Y2|U)]+
(15)
where U, VD, VR and V2 are auxiliary random variables, and the maximum is over all joint
distributions satisfying U → (VR, VD, V2)→ (XR, XD, X2)→ (Y, Y1, Y2).
Proof: The proof is extended from the outer bound in [11, Theorem 1] to include auxiliary
random variables corresponding to each of the transmitted signals and is developed in Appendix
A.
Following Proposition 1, a natural question for the relay-eavesdropper channel with orthogonal
components is whether the PDF strategy can achieve the secrecy capacity. To this end, we first
develop the achievable PDF secrecy rates for the class of full-duplex relay-eavesdropper channels
and then specialize the result for the orthogonal model. The following theorem summarizes the
inner bounds on the secrecy capacity achieved by PDF for the full-duplex (non-orthogonal)
relay-eavesdropper channels.
Theorem 2: An inner bound on the secrecy capacity of a full-duplex relay eavesdropper
channel, achieved using partial decode and forward, is given by
Cs ≥ min{I(X1; Y |X2, V ) + I(V ; Y1|X2), I(X1X2V ; Y )} − I(X1X2; Y2) (16)
for all joint distributions of the form
p(v)p(x1|v)p(x2|v)p(y1, y|x1, x2). (17)
9Proof: The proof is developed in Appendix B and uses block Markov superposition encoding
at the source such that in each block, the relay decodes a part of the source message while the
eavesdropper has access to both source messages.
The following theorem specializes Theorem 2 for the orthogonal relay-eavesdropper channel.
Theorem 3: An inner bound on the secrecy capacity of the orthogonal relay eavesdropper
channel, achieved using partial decode and forward over all joint distributions of the form
p(xR, xD, x2), is given by
Case 1 : Cs ≥ min{I(XDXR; Y Y1|X2), I(XDX2; Y )} − I(XR; Y2)
Case 2 : Cs ≥ min{I(XDXR; Y Y1|X2), I(XDX2; Y )} − I(XD, X2; Y2)
Case 3 : Cs ≥ min{I(XDXR; Y Y1|X2), I(XDX2; Y )} − I(XR; Y2|X2)− I(XD, X2; Y2)
(18)
Proof: The proof is developed in Appendix C and involves specializing the bounds in
Theorem 2 for the orthogonal model. It is further shown that the input distribution can be
generalized to all joint probability distributions p(xR, xD, x2).
The bounds in (18) can be generalized by randomizing the channel inputs. We now prove that
PDF with randomization achieves the secrecy capacity.
Theorem 4: The secrecy capacity of the relay channel with orthogonal complements is
Case 1 : Cs = max[min{I(VDVR; Y Y1|V2U), I(VDV2; Y |U)} − I(VR; Y2|U)]+
Case 2 : Cs = max[min{I(VDVR; Y Y1|V2U), I(VDV2; Y |U)} − I(VDV2; Y2|U)]+
Case 3 : Cs ≤ max[min{I(VDVR; Y Y1|V2U), I(VDV2; Y |U)} − I(VRVDV2; Y2|U)]+
(19)
where U, VD, VR and V2 are auxiliary random variables, and the maximum is over all joint
distributions satisfying U → (VR, VD, V2) → (XR, XD, X2) → (Y, Y1, Y2). Furthermore, for
Case 3,
Cs ≥ [min{I(VDVR; Y Y1|V2U), I(VDV2; Y |U)} − I(VR; Y2|V2U)− I(VD, V2; Y2|U)]
+ (20)
for all joint distributions satisfying U → (VR, VD, V2)→ (XR, XD, X2)→ (Y, Y1, Y2).
Proof: The upper bounds follow from Theorem 1. For the lower bound, we prefix a mem-
oryless channel with inputs VR, VD, and V2 and transition probability p(xR, xD, x2|vR, vD, v2)
(this prefix can potentially increase the achievable secrecy rates as in [2, 11]). The time-sharing
random variable U ensures that the set of achievable rates is convex.
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Remark 3: In contrast to the non secrecy case, where the orthogonal channel model simplifies
the cut-set bounds to match the inner PDF bounds, for the orthogonal relay-eavesdropper model in
which the eavesdropper receives in both channels, i.e., when the orthogonal receiver restrictions
at the relay and intended destination do not apply to the eavesdropper, in general, the outer
bound can be strictly larger than the inner PDF bound.
In the following section, we illustrate these results with three examples.
IV. EXAMPLES
Example 1: Consider a orthogonal relay eavesdropper channel with XR = XD = X2 = {0, 1}.
The outputs at the relay and destination are given by
Y1 = XR and (21)
Y = XDX2, (22)
while the output at the eavesdropper is
Y2,1 = XR (channel 1) and
Y2,2 =


1 if XD ≤ X2
0 otherwise
(channel 2).
(23)
Since the destination can receive at most 1 bit in every use of the channel, the secrecy capacity
of this channel is at most 1 bit per channel use. We now show that this secrecy capacity can be
achieved. In each channel use, let the source send bit w ∈ {0, 1} such that XR = 0, XD = w,
and X2 = 1. Since X2 = 1, the receiver obtains w while the eavesdropper receives Y2,1 = 0
and Y2,2 = 1 irrespective of the value of bit w. Hence, a perfect secrecy capacity of 1 can be
achieved.
The code design in Example 1 did not require randomization. We now present an example
where randomization is necessary.
Example 2: Consider an orthogonal relay eavesdropper channel where all the input and output
alphabets are the same and given by {0, 1}2. We write XR = (aR, bR), XD = (aD, bD), and
X2 = (a1, b1) to denote the vector binary signals at the source and the relay. The outputs of this
11
channel, shown in Figure 2(a), at the relay, destination, and the eavesdropper are given by
Y = (aD, bD ⊕ a1), (24)
Y1 = (aR, bR), (25)
Y2,1 = (aR, bR) and (26)
Y2,2 = (a1, b1 ⊕ aD), (27)
where ⊕ denotes the binary XOR operation. The capacity of this channel is at most 2 bits per
channel use as the destination, via Y , can receive at most 2 bits per channel use. We will now
show that a secrecy capacity of 2 bits per channel use can be achieved. Consider the following
coding scheme. In every channel use, the relay flips an unbiased coin to generate a bit n ∈ {0, 1}
such that its transmitted signal is
X2 = (0, n).
In every use of the channel, the source transmits 2 bits, denoted as w1 and w2, using
XR = (0, 0) and
XD = (w1, w2).
For these transmitted signals, the receiver and eavesdropper receive
Y = (w1, w2), (28)
Y2,1 = (0, 0) and (29)
Y2,2 = (0, n⊕ w1). (30)
Thus, the receiver receives both bits while the eavesdropper is unable to decode any information
due to the randomness of n. This is an example where transmitting a random code from the
relay is required to achieve the secrecy capacity.
In the above two examples, the source to relay link was completely available to the eaves-
dropper and hence the relay could at best be just used to send random bits. In the next example,
we show that the secrecy capacity is achieved by the relay transmitting a part of the message
as well as a random signal.
Example 3: Consider an orthogonal relay eavesdropper channel where the input and output
signals at the source, relay, and destination are binary two-tuples while Y2,1 and Y2,2 at the
12
Y
X2
aR
bR
aD
bD
Y1 a1
b1
Y2,2
Y2,1
XR
XD
(a) Example 2
Y1
Y
XD
aD
XR
aR
bR
b1
X2
a1
Y2,2
Y2,1
(b) Example 3
Fig. 2. Orthogonal relay eavesdropper channel model of Examples 2 and 3.
eavesdropper are binary alphabets. We write XR = (aR, bR), XD = aD and X2 = (a1, b1) to
denote the vector binary signals at the source and the relay. The outputs at the relay, destination
and the eavesdropper are also vector binary signals given by
Y = (a1, aD), (31)
Y1 = (aR, bR), (32)
Y2,1 = (bR) and (33)
Y2,2 = (b1 ⊕ aD), (34)
as shown in Figure 2(b). As in the previous example, the capacity of this channel is also at most
2 bits per channel use. We now show that a secrecy capacity of 2 bits per channel use can be
achieved for this example channel. Consider the following coding scheme: in the ith use of the
channel, the source encodes 2 bits, denoted as w1,i and w2,i as
XR = (w1,i, 0) and
XD = (w2,i).
The relay receives w1,i−1 in the previous use of the channel. Furthermore, in each channel use,
it also generates a uniformly random bit ni, and transmits
X2 = (w1,i−1, ni). (35)
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With these transmitted signals, the received signals at the receiver and the eavesdropper are
Y = (w1,i−1, w2,i), (36)
Y2,1 = (0) and (37)
Y2,2 = (ni ⊕ w2,i). (38)
Thus, over n+ 1 uses of the channel the destination receives all 2n+ 1 bits transmitted by the
source. On the other hand, in every use of the channel, the eavesdropper cannot decode either
source bit.
V. GAUSSIAN MODEL
A. Inner and Outer Bounds
We now develop inner and outer bounds for the Gaussian orthogonal relay eavesdropper
channel. Determining the optimal input distribution for all the auxiliary random variables in the
outer bounds in Theorem 4 is not straightforward. To this end, we develop new outer bounds
using a recent result on the secrecy capacity of the class of Gaussian multiple input, multiple
output, multi-antenna eavesdropper channels (see [4–6]). The class of MIMOME channels is
characterized by a single source with an m×1 vector input X and k×1 and t×1 vector outputs
Y and Ye at the intended destination and eavesdropper, respectively, given by
Y[i] = HX[i] + Z[i] and
Ye[i] = HeX[i] + Ze[i]
(39)
where in every channel use i, Z[i] and Ze[i] are zero-mean Gaussian vectors with identity
covariance matrices that are independent across time symbols. The channel input satisfies an
average transmit power constraint:
1
n
∑n
i=1
‖x‖2 ≤ P. (40)
In applying the multi-antenna secrecy capacity results, we develop an outer bound in which the
source and relay are modeled jointly as a multi-antenna transmitter. However, unlike the average
power constraint for the MIMOME channels in (40), our outer bound requires a per antenna
power constraint. To this end, we apply the results developed in [5] in which a more general
transmitter covariance constraint is considered such that
1
n
∑n
i=1
(
x [i]xT [i]
)
 S (41)
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where S is a positive semidefinite matrix and A  B denotes that B−A is a positive semidefinite
matrix. The secrecy capacity of this channel is summarized in the following theorem.
Lemma 1 ([5]): The secrecy capacity of the MIMOME channel of (39) subject to (41) is
given by
Cs = max
0KXS
(
1
2
log det
(
I+HKXH
T
)
−
1
2
log det
(
I+HeKXH
T
e
))
. (42)
Remark 4: The expression in (42) can also be written as
Cs = max[I(X
∗;Y)− I(X∗;Ye)] (43)
where he maximum is over all X∗ ∼ N (0,KX).
We now present an outer bound on the Gaussian orthogonal relay eavesdropper channel using
Lemma 1.
Theorem 5: An outer bound on the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian orthogonal relay eaves-
dropper channel is given by
Case 1 : Cs ≤ max[I(XDX2; Y )− I(XR; Y2)] (44a)
Case 2 : Cs ≤ max[I(XDX2; Y )− I(XDX2; Y2)] (44b)
Case 3 : Cs ≤ max[I(XDX2; Y )− I(XRXDX2; Y2)] (44c)
where the maximum is over all [XR XD X2]T ∼ N (0,KX) where KX = E[XXT ] has diagonal
entries that satisfy (10).
Remark 5: In (44a) and (44c), the X∗R maximizing the outer bound on the secrecy capacity
is X∗R = 0. On the other hand, X∗R can be chosen to be arbitrary for (44b).
Proof: An outer bound on the secrecy capacity of the relay eavesdropper channel results
from assuming that the source and relay can cooperate over a noiseless link without causality
constraints. Under this assumption, the problem reduces to that of a MIMOME channel. Thus,
applying Lemma 1 and using the form in (43), for X = [XR XD X2]T ∼ N (0,KX), the secrecy
capacity can be upper bounded as
Cs ≤ max[I(XRXDX2; Y )− I(XRXDX2; Y2)] (45)
= max[I(XDX2; Y ) + I(XR; Y |XDX2)− I(XRXDX2; Y2)] (46)
= max[I(XDX2; Y )− I(XRXDX2; Y2)] (47)
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where (47) follows from the orthogonal model in (5). Finally, applying the conditions on the
eavesdropper receiver for the three cases simplifies the bounds in (47) to (44).
The PDF inner bounds developed in Section III for the discrete memoryless case can be
applied to the Gaussian model with Gaussian inputs at the source and relay. In fact, for all three
cases, the inner bounds require taking a minimum of two rates, one achieved jointly by the source
and relay at the destination and the other achieved by the source at the relay and destination.
Comparing the inner bounds in (18) with the outer bounds in (44), for those channels in which
the source and relay are clustered close enough that the bottle-neck link is the combined source-
relay link to the destination and the eavesdropper overhears only the channel from the source
and the relay to the destination, the secrecy capacity can be achieved. This is summarized in the
following theorem.
Theorem 6: For a class of clustered orthogonal Gaussian relay channels with
I(XDX2; Y ) < max
p(xR|xD,x2)
I(XDXR; Y Y1|X2), (48)
the secrecy capacity for case 2 is achieved by PDF and is given by
Case 2 : Cs = max[I(XDX2; Y )− I(XD, X2; Y2)] (49)
where the maximum is over X = [XR XD X2]T ∼ N (0,KX).
For a relay channel without secrecy constraints, the cut-set outer bounds are equivalent to
two multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) bounds, one that results from assuming a noiseless
source-relay link and the other that results from assuming a noiseless relay-destination link.
Under a secrecy constraint, the outer bound in Theorem 5 is based on the assumption of a
noiseless source-relay link. The corresponding bound with a noiseless relay-destination link
remains unknown.
We now consider a sub-class of Gaussian orthogonal relay eavesdropper channels for which
hs,r = 0. For this sub-class, the source does not send any messages on channel 1, i.e., XR = 0.
Such a sub-class is a subset of a larger sub-class of channels with very noisy unreliable links
from the source to the relay. We present an upper bound on the secrecy capacity for this sub-
class and show that the noise-forwarding strategy introduced in [11] achieves this outer bound.
Central to our proof is an additional constraint introduced in developing the outer bounds on the
eavesdropper that it does not decode the relay transmissions. Clearly, limiting the eavesdropper
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capabilities can only improve the secrecy rates, and thus, an outer bound for this channel with a
constrained eavesdropper is also an outer bound for the original channel (with hs,r = 0 in both
cases) with an unconstrained eavesdropper. We show that the outer bound for the constrained
channel can be achieved by the strategy of noise-forwarding developed for the unconstrained
channel.
Theorem 7: The secrecy capacity of a sub-class of Gaussian orthogonal relay eavesdropper
channels with hs,r = 0 for Cases 2 and 3 is given by
Cs = max
E[XD]2≤PD,E[X2]2≤P2
min
{
C
(
|hs,d|
2E[X2D] + |hr,d|
2E[X22 ]
)
− C
(
|hs,e,2|
2E[X2D] + |hr,e|
2E[X22 ]
)
,
C(|hs,d|
2E[X2D])− C
(
|hs,e,1|
2E[X2D]/(1 + |hr,e|
2E[X22 ])
)}
. (50)
Proof: Outer Bound: An outer bound on the secrecy capacity is obtained by applying
Theorem 5 for Cases 2 and 3 as
Cs ≤ max[I(XDX2; Y )− I(XDX2; Y2)] (51)
= max
E[XD]2≤PD,E[X2]2≤P2
[C(|hs,d|
2E[X2D] + |hr,d|
2E[X22 ])− C(|hs,e,2|
2E[X2D] + |hr,e|
2E[X22 ])]
(52)
where (52) holds because hs,r = 0 implies XR = 0. This follows from the fact that due to a lack
of a communication link between the source and the relay, i.e., hs,r = 0, the relay is oblivious to
the source transmissions. Since the relay and the source do not share common randomness, one
can set XR = 0. Further, since X2 depends on XD only via XR and XR = 0, X2 is independent
of XD. Finally, the optimality of Gaussian signaling follows from Theorem 5.
We now develop a second outer bound under the assumption that the relay and the destination
have a noiseless channel such that they act like a two-antenna receiver. One can alternately
view this as an improved channel that results from having a genie that shares perfectly the
transmitted and received signals at the relay with the destination. Since X2 is independent of
XD, the destination can perfectly cancel X2 from its received signal, and thus, from (9), the
effective received signal at the destination can be written as
Y ′ = hs,dXD + Z. (53)
On the other hand for the constrained eavesdropper, since the relay’s signal X2 acts as interference
and is independent of XD, the information received at the eavesdropper is minimized when X2
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is the worst case noise, i.e., when it is Gaussian distributed [18, Theorem II.1]. The equivalent
signal received at the eavesdropper is then
Y ′2,2 = hs,e,2XD +
√
|hr,e|2E[X22 ] + 1Z
′
2,2 (54)
where Z ′2,2 is Gaussian with zero mean and unit variance. Thus, the constrained eavesdropper
channel simplifies to a MIMOME channel with a single-antenna source transmitting XD and
single-antenna receiver and eavesdropper receiving Y ′ and Y ′2,2, respectively. For this channel,
from Lemma 1, the secrecy capacity of this constrained eavesdropper channel is upper bounded
as
Cs ≤ max
E[XD]2≤PD,E[X2]2≤P2
[C(|hs,d|
2E[X2D])− C
(
|hs,e,1|
2E[X2D]/(1 + |hr,e|
2E[X22 ])
)
]. (55)
Finally, since (55) is an upper bound for the channel with an eavesdropper constrained to ignore
X2, it is also an upper bound for the channel in which the eavesdropper is not constrained.
Inner Bound: The lower bound follows from the noise forwarding strategy introduced in [11,
Theorem 3]. In this strategy, the relay sends codewords independent of the source message,
which helps in confusing the eavesdropper. The noise forwarding strategy transforms the relay-
eavesdropper channel into a compound multiple access channel, where the source/relay to the
receiver is the first multiple access channel and the source/relay to the eavesdropper is the second
one.
B. Illustration of Results
We illustrate our results for the Gaussian model for a class of linear networks in which the
source is placed at the origin and the destination is unit distance from the source at (1, 0). The
eavesdropper is at (1.5, 0). The channel gain hm,k, between transmitter m and receiver k, for
each m and k, is modeled as a distance dependent path-loss gain given by
hm,k =
1
d
α/2
m,k
for all m ∈ {s, r} , k ∈ {r, d, e} (56)
where α is the path-loss exponent. The maximum achievable PDF secrecy rate is plotted as
a function of the relay position along the line connecting the source and the eavesdropper as
shown in Figure V-B. Furthermore, as a baseline assuming the relay does not transmit, i.e.,
XR = 0, the secrecy capacity of the resulting direct link and the wire-tap channel for cases 2
18
and 3, respectively, are included in all three plots in Fig. V-B. The rates are plotted in separate
sub-figures for the three cases in which the eavesdropper receives signals in only one or both
channels. In all cases, the path loss exponent α is set to 2 and the average power constraint
on XR, XD , and X2 is set to unity. In addition to PDF, the secrecy rate achieved by noise
forwarding (NF) is also plotted.
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(c) Case 3.
Fig. 3. Source is at (0, 0), destination at (1, 0) and eavesdropper is at (1.5, 0). A distance fading model with α = 2 is taken
and power constraints for XR, XD and X2 are all unity.
In Fig V-B, for all three cases, the PDF secrecy rates are obtained by choosing the input signal
X = [XR XD X2]
T to be Gaussian distributed and numerically optimizing the rates over the
covariance matrix KX = E[XXT ] (more precisely the three variances of XR, XD, X2 and the
pairwise correlation among these three variables). We observe that the numerical results match
the theoretical capacity result for Case 2 that PDF is optimal when the relay is close to the
source. Further, the upper bounds for Case 2 and Case 3 are the same as seen also in (44b)-
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(44c). On the other hand, when the relay is farther away than the eavesdropper and destination
are from the source, there are no gains achieved by using the relay relative to the non-relay
wiretap secrecy capacity. Finally, for cases 2 and 3, NF performs better than PDF when the
relay is closer to the destination.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed bounds on the secrecy capacity of relay eavesdropper channels with
orthogonal components in the presence of an additional passive eavesdropper for both the
discrete memoryless and Gaussian channel models. Our results depend on the capability of
the eavesdropper to overhear either or both of the two orthogonal channels that the source uses
for its transmissions. For the discrete memoryless model, when the eavesdropper is restricted to
receiving in only one of the two channels, we have shown that the secrecy capacity is achieved
by a partial decode-and-forward strategy.
For the Gaussian model, we have developed a new outer bound using recent results on
the secrecy capacity of Gaussian MIMOME channels. When the eavesdropper is restricted to
overhearing on the channel from the source and the relay to the destination, our bound is tight for
a sub-class of channels where the source and the relay are clustered such that the combined link
from the source and the relay to the destination is the bottleneck. Furthermore, for a sub-class
where the source-relay link is not used, we have developed a new MIMOME-based outer bound
that matches the secrecy rate achieved by the noise forwarding strategy.
A natural extension to this model is to study the secrecy capacity of orthogonal relay channels
with multiple relays and multiple eavesdroppers (see, for example, [19]). Also, the problem of
developing an additional outer bound that considers a noiseless relay destination link remains
open for the channel studied here.
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PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we will prove the upper bounds on the secrecy capacity for all the three cases.
Following a proof similar to that in [11, Theorem 1], we bound the equivocation as
nRe ≤
n∑
i=1
[I(W1; Yi|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)− I(W1; Y2,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)] + nδn. (57)
Now, let J be a random variable uniformly distributed over {1, 2, · · · , n} and set U = JY i−1Y n2,i+1,
VR = JY2,i+1W1, VD = JY
n
2,i+2W1, V2 = JY
i−1
, Y1 = Y1,J , Y2 = Y2,J and Y = YJ . We specialize
the bounds in (57) separately for each case.
A. Case 1
From (57), we have
Re ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(W1; Yi|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)− I(W1; Y2,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)] + δn
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(W1, Y
n
2,i+2, Y
i−1; Yi|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)− I(W1, Y2,i+1; Y2,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)] + δn
= I(VD, V2; Y |U)− I(VR; Y2|U) + δn. (58)
Furthermore,
Re ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(W1; Yi|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)− I(W1; Y2,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)] + δn
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(W1, Y
n
2,i+1, Y
i−1; Yi|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)− I(W1, Y2,i+1; Y2,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)] + δn
≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(W1, Y
n
2,i+1, Y
i−1; Yi, Y1,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)− I(W1, Y2,i+1; Y2,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)] + δn
= I(VD, VR, V2; Y, Y1|V2, U)− I(VR; Y2|U) + δn. (59)
This proves the upper bound for case 1.
21
B. Case 2
From (57), we have
Re ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(W1; Yi|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)− I(W1; Y2,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)] + δn
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(W1, Y
n
2,i+2, Y
i−1; Yi|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)− I(W1, Y
n
2,i+2, Y
i−1; Y2,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)] + δn
= I(VD, V2; Y |U)− I(VD, V2; Y2|U) + δn. (60)
Furthermore,
Re ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(W1; Yi|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)− I(W1; Y2,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)] + δn
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(W1, Y
n
2,i+1, Y
i−1; Yi|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)− I(W1, Y
n
2,i+2, Y
i−1; Y2,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)] + δn
≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(W1, Y
n
2,i+1, Y
i−1; Yi, Y1,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)− I(W1, Y
n
2,i+2, Y
i−1; Y2,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)] + δn
= I(VD, VR, V2; Y, Y1|V2, U)− I(VD, V2; Y2|U) + δn. (61)
This proves the upper bound for case 2.
C. Case 3
From (57), we have
Re ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(W1; Yi|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)− I(W1; Y2,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)] + δn
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(W1, Y
n
2,i+2, Y
i−1; Yi|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)− I(W1, Y
n
2,i+1, Y
i−1; Y2,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)] + δn
= I(VD, V2; Y |U)− I(VR, VD, V2; Y2|U) + δn. (62)
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Furthermore,
Re ≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(W1; Yi|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)− I(W1; Y2,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)] + δn
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(W1, Y
n
2,i+1, Y
i−1; Yi|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)− I(W1, Y
n
2,i+1, Y
i−1; Y2,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)] + δn
≤
1
n
n∑
i=1
[I(W1, Y
n
2,i+1, Y
i−1; Yi, Y1,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)− I(W1, Y
n
2,i+1, Y
i−1; Y2,i|Y
i−1, Y n2,i+1)] + δn
= I(VD, VR, V2; Y, Y1|V2, U)− I(VD, V2; Y2|U) + δn. (63)
This proves the upper bound for case 3. For perfect secrecy, setting R1 = Re yields the upper
bound on the secrecy capacity.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2: PDF FOR RELAY EAVESDROPPER CHANNEL
Random Coding:
1) Generate 2n(I(X2;Y )−ǫ) independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) x2’s, each with prob-
ability p(x2) = Πni=1p(x2i). Label them x2(m), m ∈ [1, 2n(I(X2;Y )−ǫ)].
2) For each x2(m), generate 2nR1 i.i.d. v’s, each with probability p(v|x2(m)) = Πni=1p(vi|x2i(m)).
Label these v(w′|m), w ∈ [1, 2nR1].
3) For every v(w′|m), generate 2nR2 i.i.d. x1’s, each with probability p(x1|v(w′|m)) =
Πni=1p(x1i|vi(w
′|m)). Label these x1(w′′|m,w′), w′′ ∈ [1, 2nR2].
Random Partition: Randomly partition the set {1, 2, ..., 2nR1} into 2n(I(X2;Y )−ǫ) cells Sm.
Encoding: Let wi be the message to be sent in block i where the total number of mes-
sages is 2n(R1+R2−I(X1X2;Y2)). Further, let gi = (wi, li) where li ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2nI(X1X2:Y2)}. We
can further partition gi into two parts (w′i, w′′i ) of rates R1 and R2 respectively. Assume that
(y1(i − 1), v(w′i−1|mi−1), x2(mi−1)) are jointly ǫ−typical and w′i−1 ∈ Smi . Then the codeword
(x1(w
′′
i |mi, w
′
i), x2(mi)) will be transmitted in block i.
Decoding: At the end of block i, we have the following:
1) The receiver estimates mi by looking at jointly ǫ-typical x2(mi) with yi. For sufficiently
large n, this decoding step can be done with arbitrarily small probability of error. Let the
estimate of mi be mˆi.
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2) The receiver calculates a set L1(y(i−1)) of w′ such that w′ ∈ L1(y(i−1)) if (v(w′|mi−1), y(i−
1)) are jointly ǫ-typical. The receiver then declares that w′i−1 was sent in block i − 1 if
wˆ′i−1 ∈ Smi∩L1(y(i−1)). The probability that wˆ′i−1 = w′i−1 with arbitrarily high probability
provided n is sufficiently large and R1 < I(X2; Y ) + I(V ; Y |X2)− ǫ.
3) The receiver declares that w′′i−1 was sent in block i− 1 if (x1(wˆ′′i−1|mˆi−1, wˆ′i−1), y(i− 1))
are jointly ǫ−typical. wˆ′′i−1 = w′′i−1 with high probability if R2 = I(X1; Y |X2, V )− ǫ and
n is sufficiently large.
4) The relay upon receiving y1(i) declares that wˆ′ was received if (v(wˆ′|mi), y1(i), x2(mi)) are
jointly ǫ−typical. w′i = wˆ′ with high probability if R1 < I(V ; Y1|X2) and n is sufficiently
large. Thus, the relay knows that w′i ∈ Smi+1 .
Thus, we obtain
R1 < I(X2; Y ) + I(V ; Y |X2)− ǫ, (64)
R1 < I(V ; Y1|X2) and (65)
R2 = I(X1; Y |X2, V )− ǫ. (66)
Therefore, the rate of transmission from X1 to Y is bounded by
R = R1 +R2 − I(X1X2; Y2) (67)
= min{I(X1; Y |X2, V ) + I(V ; Y1|X2), I(X1X2V ; Y )} − I(X1X2; Y2). (68)
Equivocation Computation: From [11, Theorem 2, Equation (41)], we have
H(W1|Y2) ≥ H(X1)− I(X1, X2; Y2)−H(X1, X2|W1, Y2). (69)
Consider H(X1, X2|W1, Y2). Since we know W1, the only uncertainty is the knowledge of li
which can be decoded from Y2 with arbitrarily small probability of error since li ∈ {1, .., 2nI(X1X2;Y2)}.
Hence,
H(W1|Y2) ≥ n(R1 +R2)− I(X1, X2; Y2) = nR (70)
thus giving Re = R and hence we get perfect secrecy.
Thus, the secrecy rate is given by
R = min{I(X1; Y |X2, V ) + I(V ; Y1|X2), I(X1X2V ; Y )} − I(X1X2; Y2). (71)
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3: PDF FOR RELAY EAVESDROPPER CHANNEL WITH ORTHOGONAL
COMPONENTS
From Theorem 2, a secrecy rate of
R = min{I(X1; Y |X2, V ) + I(V ; Y1|X2), I(X1X2V ; Y )} − I(X1X2; Y2) (72)
can be achieved by partial decode and forward. Let X1 = (XR, XD) and V = XR such that
the input distribution is of the form p(x2)p(xR|x2)p(xD|x2). The achievable secrecy rate is then
given by
R = min{I(XRXD; Y |X2, XR) + I(XR; Y1|X2), I(XRXDX2; Y )} − I(XRXDX2; Y2) (73)
= min{I(XD; Y |X2, XR) + I(XR; Y1|X2), I(XDX2; Y )} − I(XRXDX2; Y2) (74)
= min{I(XD; Y |X2) + I(XR; Y1|X2), I(XDX2; Y )} − I(XRXDX2; Y2). (75)
The equality in (75) follows from the fact that XD −X2 −XR is a Markov chain. We further
specialize the bounds for the three cases based on the receiving capability of the eavesdropper.
A. Case 1
R = min{I(XD; Y |X2) + I(XR; Y1|X2), I(XDX2; Y )} − I(XR; Y2). (76)
The maximization of the expression to the right of the equality in (76) over p(xD, xR, x2) =
p(x2)p(xR|x2)p(xD|x2) is equivalent to maximizing over the more general distribution p(xD, xR, x2),
and henceforth, without loss of generality we consider the general probability distribution p(xD, xR, x2).
We now prove that I(XD; Y |X2) + I(XR; Y1|X2) ≥ I(XDXR; Y Y1|X2) which completes the
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proof of this part of the theorem. We have
I(XD; Y |X2) + I(XR; Y1|X2) = H(Y |X2)−H(Y |X2XD) + I(XR; Y1|X2)
≥ H(Y |X2Y1)−H(Y |X2XD) + I(XR; Y1|X2)
= H(Y |X2Y1)−H(Y |X2XDXRY1) + I(XR; Y1|X2)
= I(Y ;XDXR|X2Y1) + I(XR; Y1|X2) (77)
= I(Y ;XDXR|X2Y1) + I(XD; Y1|X2XR) + I(XR; Y1|X2)
= I(Y ;XDXR|X2Y1) + I(XRXD; Y1|X2)
= I(Y Y1;XDXR|X2). (78)
B. Case 2
R = min{I(XD; Y |X2) + I(XR; Y1|X2), I(XDX2; Y )} − I(XDX2; Y2).
Note that maximization of above term over p(xD, xR, x2) = p(x2)p(xR|x2)p(xD|x2) is equiv-
alent to maximizing over general p(xD, xR, x2) and henceforth, without loss of generality we
consider the general probability distribution p(xD, xR, x2).
We now prove that I(XD; Y |X2) + I(XR; Y1|X2) ≥ I(XDXR; Y Y1|X2) which completes the
proof of this part of the theorem. We have
I(XD; Y |X2) + I(XR; Y1|X2) = H(Y |X2)−H(Y |X2XD) + I(XR; Y1|X2)
≥ H(Y |X2Y1)−H(Y |X2XD) + I(XR; Y1|X2)
= I(Y Y1;XDXR|X2), (79)
where the last step follows as was shown earlier in (77).
C. Case 3
R = min{I(XD; Y |X2) + I(XR; Y1|X2), I(XDX2; Y )} − I(XR; Y2|X2XD)− I(XDX2; Y2)
= min{I(XD; Y |X2) + I(XR; Y1|X2), I(XDX2; Y )} − I(XR; Y2|X2)− I(XDX2; Y2). (80)
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Note that maximization of above term over p(xD, xR, x2) = p(x2)p(xR|x2)p(xD|x2) is equiv-
alent to maximizing over general p(xD, xR, x2).
We now prove that I(XD; Y |X2) + I(XR; Y1|X2) ≥ I(XDXR; Y Y1|X2) which completes the
proof of this part of the theorem. We have
I(XD; Y |X2) + I(XR; Y1|X2) = H(Y |X2)−H(Y |X2XD) + I(XR; Y1|X2)
≥ H(Y |X2Y1)−H(Y |X2XD) + I(XR; Y1|X2)
= I(Y Y1;XDXR|X2), (81)
where the last step follows as was shown earlier in (77).
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